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 The dissertation studies a model of an economy which produces and exports 
durable goods. It analyzes the optimal monetary policy for such a country.  
Generally, monetary policy has a bigger economic effect on durable goods relative to 
non-durable goods because durable goods can be stored and households get utility from 
the stock of durable goods. This dissertation shows that, in Nash equilibrium, the central 
bank of a durable goods producing country can control changes of the price level with 
smaller changes in the monetary policy instrument. In the cooperative equilibrium, the 
monetary authority of the country which imports non-durable goods and exports durable 
goods should raise the interest rate by more, relative to the Nash case, in response to a 
rise in foreign inflation. On the other hand, the monetary authority of the country which 
imports durable goods and exports non-durable goods should raise the interest rate by 
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“A significant portion of measured consumption spending reflects purchases of 
consumer durables – long-lived items such as furniture, autos, televisions, and home 
computers. … . If all durables were rented in perfect rental markets, the durable-
nondurable distinction would be unimportant. Empirically, however, consumer 
purchases of durable items are substantial. … .”1 
 
Many New Keynesian models neglect durable goods, such as Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003). This may be due to the fact that the share of the 
durable goods sector in the gross domestic product (GDP) is quite a bit smaller than the 
non-durables and service sectors. According to Erceg and Levin (2006), the share of the 
durable goods sector in U.S. GDP is only about 12%. 
Some recent papers, however, pay attention to the role played by durable goods. 
Erceg and Levin (2006) and Monacelli (2008) show that durable goods spending is more 
sensitive to monetary shocks than non-durable goods spending. Barsky et al. (2007) 
explain these results as stemming from the special properties of durables. They write that 
durable goods have “interesting and unique properties” that are directly related to their 
length of life. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the consumption of durable 
goods is naturally high for durables with low depreciation rates, such as housing and 
                                                          
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of International Economics. 
 
1 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) p. 96 
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business structures. This plays a much larger role in fluctuations of aggregate output and 
can play a large role in business cycles.  
The unique feature of durables and the distinctive feature of long-lived durables with 
sticky prices lead to results that are different from results drawn from studies looking 
only at non-durables and comparing equilibria with sticky and flexible prices. 
Though there are recent studies about durables in closed economy, there are few 
papers focusing on durables and non-durables in an international setting. This study 
about durable goods spending in two different countries and the resulting policy 
questions will, I think, prove to be a fruitful area of research in the New Open Economy 
Macroeconomics.   
This dissertation works to provide answers to the following questions: What is the 
gain from monetary policy cooperation with durables? How does this differ from models 
with only non-durables? Which country would have more benefit from monetary policy 
cooperation, a country producing only durable goods or a country producing only non-
durable goods?  
 Several recent papers have introduced durable goods into a closed-economy model. 
Barsky et al. (2007) examine both sticky and flexible price sectors in a closed economy 
model with durable and non-durable goods, and shows that the presence of durable 
goods can alter the transmission of monetary shocks even though durables have a small 
share in total spending. Particularly, if durable prices are flexible, their work shows that 
monetary policy is neutral. If durable prices are sticky, the model works as a sticky price 
model even if non-durable prices are flexible.  
 3
Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) study the role of collateral debt in a business cycle 
model and they conclude that lowering the interest rate induces an expanding labor 
supply by increasing the demand for durable goods, instead of the standard result of a 
contracting labor supply by reducing the price of current leisure relative to future leisure. 
Monacelli (2008) studies a New Keynesian model with durable goods and argues 
that assumption on the degree of stickiness of durables may become irrelevant when 
once a collateral constraint on borrowing is introduced in the model. The reduced ability 
of borrowing also reduces the demand for non-durables when prices are sticky in durable 
goods sector. Therefore, the collateral constraint makes a complementary effect between 
durable and non-durable demand, while the monetary policy tightening produces a 
substitution effect from durables to non-durables by rising the user cost when prices are 
flexible.   
Erceg and Levin (2006) compare the performance of several monetary policies in a 
sticky price model with durable and non-durable goods, and they show that the optimal 
policy rule can be approximated by a simple targeting rule for a weighted average of 
aggregate wage and price inflation when the social welfare function consists of sector-
specific output gaps and inflation rates. 
Han (2008) examines the relationship among heterogeneous durability of 
consumption goods, price indexes and monetary policy in a sticky price model, and 
concludes that the optimal policy is to stabilize core inflation, giving more weight to the 
sector producing more durable goods. 
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A classic issue in international monetary economics is to ask whether there is a gain 
from policy coordination. Our goal is to examine this issue in an international economic 
model that includes durable goods. Recent works in international monetary economics 
area have involved the development of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. 
Clarida et al. (2002) examine international monetary policy in a two-country sticky 
price model, where each country faces a short run trade off between output and inflation. 
They show that, in the Nash equilibrium, each central bank needs to adjust its interest 
rate in response to only domestic inflation, while, in the coordinative equilibrium, there 
are gains when they should respond to foreign inflation.  
Gali and Moncelli (2005) analyze the properties and macroeconomic implications of 
alternative monetary policy regimes in a small open economy model with staggered 
price-setting, and show that a domestic inflation-based Taylor rule dominates a CPI-
based Taylor rule, and the latter dominates an exchange rate peg.  
The rest of the dissertation is structured as the following. Chapter II presents the two-
country model introducing durable goods. Chapter III describes equilibrium conditions 
when prices are flexible and sticky. Chapter IV studies the welfare function and optimal 
monetary policy in the Nash case and the case of cooperation. Concluding remarks and 





We follow the two-country model of Clarida et al. (2002). There are two regions, 
labeled H and F. While the final goods producer in country j supplies a single 
differentiated durable good, the representative household in country j is a consumer of 
all the goods produced in both country H and F. Thus all goods produced are traded 
between regions. The population of two countries is a continuum of agents on the 
interval [0, 1]. The population is divided by (n, 1] belongs to country H and [0, n] 
belongs to country F. 
In this economy, there are a large number of identical and infinitely lived households. 
The representative household derives utility from services provided by two durable 
goods and disutility from supplying labor.  
We introduce durable consumption goods as in Han (2008). The final durable goods 
are composite goods of differentiated non-durable intermediate goods. The production of 
intermediate goods requires labor as the only input. Intermediate goods are introduced to 
provide an analytically convenient mean of having sticky prices, as it is the intermediate 
goods producers who set prices in advance.  The flow of final durable goods and 
intermediate goods is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Flow of durable goods in two countries setting
 
1.  Representative Household 
The representative household of country H and F seeks to maximize a discounted 




 ( ) ( ( )) ,    ( ) ( ( ))t tt t t t
t t
E u K v N i di E u K v N i di  
 
              (2.1) 
Here E is the expectation operator, 0 1   is the discount factor, and ( )tN i  is the 
quantity of labor of type i supplied in period t. Variables with superscript * indicate 
foreign country values. 
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tK  is an argument in the utility function, a Cobb-Douglas index of two final durable 
goods stocks :   
 
       1 1* *, , , ,*
1 1,                          (1 ) (1 )
H t F t H t F t
t t
K K K K
K K
   
      
 
     (2.2) 
where   denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between ,H tK  and ,F tK . 
The stock per person of the final durable goods produced in each country j at time t is 
, ,  ,j tK j H F . tK  is the index of consumption per person of durables in the home 
country, and *tK  is the index of durable goods consumption per person in the foreign 
country. The stock of the final durable goods produced in each country j evolves 
according to a law of accumulation:  
 * * * *, , 1 , , , 1 ,(1 ) ,                 (1 )j t j j t j t j t j j t j tK K D K K D         (2.3) 
for  ,j H F , where ,j tD  is the amount of the purchased final durables produced in 
country j per capita, and 0 1j   is the depreciation rates of the final durable goods in 
country j. Note *
jj
   for j=H,F.  
Let 1t  denote the (random) payoffs in period t+1 of the financial asset portfolio 
held at the end of t. Note 1t  does not refer to the quantity held of some single type of 
bond. As assuming complete markets, households must be able, at least in principle, to 
hold any of a wide selection of instruments with different state-contingent returns. 
However, we don’t need to introduce any notation for the particular types of financial 
instruments that are traded internationally. Since any pattern of future state-contingent 
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payoffs that a household may desire can be arranged for the appropriate price, we can 
write the household’s consumption planning and wealth-accumulation problems without 
any explicit reference to the particular assets’ quantities that a household holds.2 
, 1t t  denotes the corresponding stochastic discount factor for one-period-ahead 
nominal payoffs relevant to the domestic household. 






, 1 1 , , , ,0 0
1 1* * * * * * * * * * *
, 1 1 , , , ,0 0
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where ,j tP  is the price of the final durable goods in country j, ( )tN i  is the quantity of 
labor of type i  supplied, ( )tW i  is the nominal wage of labor of type i ,  ( )t i  is the 
nominal profit from sales of intermediate good i , and tT  represent net lump-sum tax 
collections by the government. 
The first-order conditions are given by 
 , , , 1 , 1
1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 1, 2 ,
/ (1 )( )
( ) / (1 )
H t t H t H t t H tk t
k t t t H t t H t H t t H t
K K P Pu K




      
        (2.5) 
       Let tR  denote the gross nominal yield on a one-period discount bond. Then by 
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  (2.8) 
for [0,1]i , where * *, , , ,/ /t F t H t F t H tH Q Q Q Q  ,  1 , 1t t t tR E    is the expected price of 
the discount bonds paying off one unit of domestic currency in t+1, and the user cost of 
durable goods consumption in country j ,j tQ is defined as 
 
, , , 1
* * * * *
, , , 1
(1 ) /
(1 ) /
j t j t t j j t t
j t j t t j j t t
Q P E P R





    
    
 (2.9) 
The cost of living index (COLI) tQ  is defined as  
 *1 * *1, , , ,,                                        t H t F t t H t F tQ Q Q Q Q Q
      (2.10) 
According to Cobb-Douglas preferences, the demand functions are given by 
 
* * * *
, , , ,
* * * *
, , , ,
(1 )( / ) ,             (1 )( / )
    ( / ) ,                       ( / )
H t t H t t H t t H t t
F t t F t t F t t F t t
K Q Q K K Q Q K
K Q Q K K Q Q K
 
 
   
   (2.11) 
 
2. Firms and Price Setting 
2.1 Final Goods Producers 
We assume final durables producers behave competitively. The technology for 
producing the final goods in country H and F from intermediate goods is   
 
1 11 11 1* *
0 0




               (2.12) 
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where tY  is output per person and θ>1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods 
produced within a country.  
Maximization of profits yields demand functions for the typical intermediate good i 
in country H and F: 
    * * * *( ) ( ) / ,             ( ) ( ) /t t t t t t t tY i P i P Y Y i P i P Y     (2.13) 
The country’s price index consistent with the final goods producer in each country 
earning zero profits respectively, is given by 
 
1 1
1 11 11 * * 1
, ,0 0
( )                 ( )H t t F t tP P i di P P i di
                 (2.14) 
 
2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers 
Intermediate goods producers behave as monopolistic competitors. Each of the 
differentiated intermediate goods uses a specialized labor input in its production. The 
technology for producing intermediate goods type ,i H F  is 
 * * *( ) ( ),           ( ) ( )    t t t t t tY i A N i Y i A N i   (2.15) 
We assume that time-varying exogenous technology factors *,  t tA A  are identical 
across suppliers within a country. 
The variable cost of supplying a quantity *( ),  ( )t tY i Y i  of good i  is given by 
 * * *
( ) ( ) /
( ) ( ) /
t t t
t t t
W i Y i A
W i Y i A
 (2.16) 
Differentiating (2.16) with respect to the intermediate good, we find that the 
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The Case of Perfectly Flexible Prices 
As usual in a model of monopolistic competition, it is assumed that each supplier 
understands that its sales depend upon the price charged for its good, according to the 
demand function (2.13). 
If prices are perfectly flexible, optimization by the supplier of good i in country j 
involves setting a price * **( ) ( ),    ( ) ( )1 1t t t t
P i NMC i P i NMC i     , where 
/( 1) 1      is the seller’s desired markup, determined by the usual Lerner formula, 
and *,   is the subsidy to intermediate good production  in country H and F. 
It follows that each supplier wishes to charge a relative price satisfying 
 * * *, , *( ) / ( ),          ( ) / ( )1 1t H t t t F t t
P i P MC i P i P MC i      (2.19) 




* * * * *
, , , ,
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The Calvo Model of Price Setting 
Following the Calvo style’s price-setting, fractions *0 1,   0 1      of inter-
mediate goods prices in country H, F remain unchanged each period, whereas new prices 
are chosen for the other *1 ,   1    of the intermediate goods in country H, F. For 
simplicity, the probability that any given price will be adjusted in any given period is 
assumed to be *1 ,   1   , independent of the length of time since the price was set and 
of what the particular good’s current price may be. 
Then, the Dixit-Stiglitz price index of country j in period t satisfies 
 
1
0 1 1 1
, , , 1
1
* * *01 * * 1 1
, , , 1
(1 )
(1 )
H t H t H t









    
    
 (2.21) 
An intermediate goods supplier in country H, F that changes its price in period t and 
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where , , ,( ( ) / ) / ( ( ) / )
k
t t k k t k j t k k t j tu K Q u K Q    , 
and  , ( ) ( ) /t t k t t k t kY i P i P Y   . 
The first order condition for the optimal choice of 0tP  is  
  0 , ,
0
( 1)(1 ) ( ) ( ( ) / ) / ( ) 0kt t k t N t t k t k t k t t k
k
E P i v Y i A A Y i        

        (2.23) 
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where ( ) /t k k t k t ku K Q    . 
  
3. Government Policy 
The fiscal authority chooses a subsidy rate   that maximizes the utility of the 
domestic household in a zero inflation steady state. Meanwhile, the central bank 
determines the short-term nominal interest rate by a time-invariant commitment rule. 
The monetary authority supplies bonds in amounts enough to meet bond demand at the 
target nominal-interest rate. That means the central bank, as issuer of bonds that promise 
to pay units of its own bonds, can fix both the nominal interest rate on its bonds and the 
quantity of bonds in existence. In a cashless economy, the central bank stabilizes the 
price level around a desired level through adjusting the interest rate paid on central-bank 
balances.  




( ) ( )t t t t t tB T R B P i Y i di      (2.24) 
where tB  is government debt (the supply of bond) per person at end of period t.    
The foreign country’s government budget constraint in time t is given by  
 
1* * * * * * *
1 1 0
( ) ( )t t t t t tB T R B P i Y i di      (2.25) 
 
4. Uncovered Interest Parity 
We assume the complete international financial markets. This means that real rates 
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where trr  is real interest rate, 
*log( / ) t t tP P  from the law of one price and PPP and 
1log( / ) t t tP P  . 
We introduce the nominal exchange rate and the link between prices for two goods 
produced by the two countries. We call t  the nominal exchange rate, denoted the price 
of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. We have the law of one price that 
goods sell for the same price in both the home and foreign countries. This requires 
* *
, , , , ,  /  H t H t t F t t F tP P P P    
 
5. Market Clearing Conditions 
Market clearing conditions  
Labor market :  d st t tN N N    (2.26) 
Intermediate goods market : * *( ) , ( )t t t tY i Y Y i Y   (2.27) 






(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
t H t H t
t F t F t
n Y n D nD
nY n D nD
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    (2.28) 
Bond market : 
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Walras’ law holds in the economy. Suppose labor and intermediate goods markets 
are in equilibrium. Then combining the household’s budget constraint and the profit 
functions of intermediate suppliers yields the bond demand function in the form3 
  1 1, 1 1 , , , ,0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t H t H t F t F tE T P i Y i di P i Y i di P D P D            (2.30) 
Rearranging the government budget constraint, one has the bond supply function 




( ) ( )st t t t t tB R B T P i Y i di      (2.31) 
Combining (2.30) and (2.31) gives  
    , 1 1 1 1 , , , , ,t t t t t t t t H t t H t H t F t F tE B R B P Y P D P D             (2.32) 
We can get foreign country’s equation along with the same analogues. 
    * * * * * * * * * * * *, 1 1 1 1 , , , , ,t t t t t t t t F t t H t H t F t F tE B R B P Y P D P D             (2.33) 
Multiply economic scale and nominal exchange rate for country F  
    
    
, 1 1 1 1 1 , , , , ,
* * * * * * * * * * * *
 , 1 1  1 1 , , , , ,
(1 ) (1 )t t t t t t t t H t t H t H t F t F t
t t t t t t t t t t F t t H t H t F t F t
n E n B R B P Y P D P D
n E n B R B P Y P D P D
    
   
          
           (2.34) 
From the bond market clearing condition and the zero trade balance 
condition, * * , , , ,(1 ) 0,t H t H t F t F tTB n P D n P D     (2.34) can be rewritten as  
                                                          
3 The profit function of intermediate supplier of type i is given by 
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t F t F t
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nY n D nD
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    (2.35) 
Equation (2.35) is the final good market clearing condition. Thus, Walras’ law holds 





For a real variable tX , we define log( / )t tx X X , log( / )t tx X X , and  
ˆ log( / )t t tx X X , where X  and tX  are the steady state value and the natural rate of 
tX , respectively. 
We define t  : the aggregate stock of the final good produced in country H per 
capita and *
t






(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
t H t H t
t F t F t
n n K nK
n n K nK
    
     (3.1) 






t t H t







    
      (3.2) 
 *t tK K  (3.3)4 
From the demand functions (2.11) 
  
,
* * * *
,
(1 ) (1 )H t t t t
F t t t t




   
   (3.4) 
It then follows the relation of the aggregate stock of the final good produced in 
country H and F 
                                                          
4 Proof is Appendix A.1. 
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       
 (3.5) 
where * *, , , ,/ /t F t H t F t H tH Q Q Q Q   
 
1.  Steady-State Equilibrium 
In the steady-state (with no inflation), from the first order necessary conditions for 
the household’s decision problem, we have: 
 1/R   (3.6) 
 1( / )(1 / )F HK K H     (3.7) 




v Y A W
u K Q
  (3.8) 
Laws of accumulation of durable goods is 
 








     (3.9) 









n Y n D nD
nY n D nD
   
    (3.10) 
 *( ) , ( )Y i Y Y i Y   (3.11) 
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 * *( ) ( ),  ( ) ( )Y i A N i Y i A N i   (3.12) 
 *(1 ) 0n n      (3.13) 
 
2. Flexible-Price Equilibrium 
When prices are fully flexible, prices are set as a mark-up over marginal costs, 
monetary policy is neutral, and thus, real variables are affected by only real disturbances 
(productivity shocks in our model). 
In flexible-price equilibrium, quantities and prices of each differentiated good are 
equal: 
 * *( ) , ( )t t t tY i Y Y i Y   (3.14) 
and 
 * *( ) ,  ( )t t t tP i P P i P   (3.15) 
 
The Domestic Flexible Price Equilibrium 
The flexible domestic price equilibrium can be represented by the following a 
linearized system: 
From (3.2),  
  11 (1 )t t H t
H
y        (3.16) 
From (3.5), 
 t t tk h    (3.17) 
 *t t th     (3.18) 
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 *(1 )t t tk       (3.19) 
Define / ( )k kku Ku    is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private 
expenditure, and /NN NNv v   is the elasticity of marginal disutility of work. Note that 
the upper bar means the domestic flexible price equilibrium. 
 *0 1, 1 1
C
H t t t t trr E E
         (3.20)
5 
where 0 (1 )(1 )       , 1 (1 )     and 1 1t t t       
Every final goods producing firm chooses the same price under flexible prices. It 
follows ,( ) / 1t H tP i P   on (3.18). Using real marginal cost 1( )tMC i 
 , we have the 
country’s natural rates from (3.19) 
 *0 1 ,




     
       (3.21)6 
where / 1 (1 )H H H Hq Q P      . The relationship between real interest rates by the 
acquisition approach and the user cost approach is  
  , , , 11 (1 )C A AH t H t H t H t
H
rr rr q E rr
q 
    (3.22) 
Assuming the technology shocks are stationary, the natural rate of the durable good 
stock evolves the following process7:  
    *11 2 1 1 1(1 ) (1 )t t t t H t t H t tE q a q E a                 (3.23) 
                                                          
5 Appendix A.2. 
6 Appendix A.3. 
7 Appendix A.4. 
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where  201 1 (1 )H H
H
q    
      
, 2 (1 )H
H
    
For 0 1 H    , 
 







(1 ) (1 )
1 (1 ) (1 )
t t t t H t t H t t
t t t t t H t t H t t
E q a q E a
E q a q E a
         
          
  
  
          
                
 
      *2 11 1 1(1 ) (1 )t t t t t H t t H t tE q a q E a                   (3.24) 
with 21 2 ( 1)    . 
 
 
The Flexible Price Equilibrium 
The double upper bar means the natural level when prices are flexible worldwide. 
  * * * 11 (1 )t t H t
H
y        (3.25) 
From (3.5), 
 * * *(1 )t t tk h     (3.26) 
 *t t th     (3.27) 
 *(1 )t t tk       (3.28) 
 *0 1, 1 1
C
H t t t t trr E E
         (3.29) 
where 0 (1 )(1 )       , 1 (1 )     
 *32, 1 1
C
F t t t t trr E E
         (3.30) 
where 2 (1 )(1 )     , 3 (1 )       
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    *11 2 1 1 1(1 ) (1 )t t t t H t t H t tE q a q E a                 (3.31) 
where  201 1 (1 )H H
H
q    
      
, 2 (1 )H
H
    
    * * * 23 4 1 1 1(1 ) (1 )t t t t F t t F t tE q a q E a                 (3.32) 
where  233 1 (1 )F F
F
q    
      
, 4 (1 )F
F
    
 
3. Sticky-Price Equilibrium 
The log-linearization of the Euler equation and the equations around the zero-
inflation steady-state, respectively, are given by 
  1 1Ct t t t t tk E k r E      (3.33) 
  11 (1 )t t H t
H
y        (3.34) 
 t t tk h    (3.35) 
 *t t th     (3.36) 
where  1log /Ct t tQ Q   is the COLI inflation rate, and the real interest rate measured 
by the user cost can be rewritten as  
    1 , 1 1C Ct t t t t H t t t tr E r E E h h          (3.37) 
    , 1 , 1 1 , 21 (1 )C A At t H t t t t H t H t H t
H
r E E r E q r
q
              (3.38) 
where  , , , 1log /CH t H t H tQ Q  , and  , , , 1log /AH t H t H tP P  . 
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Combining above equations, one obtains 
 *0 1 1 1 ,
C
t t t t H tE E rr          (3.39) 
With (3.20),  
  
0
1 , 1 ,ˆ ˆ
C C
t t t t t H t H tE r E rr
        (3.40) 
With (3.29),  
    * *0 11 1 , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ C Ct t t t t t H t H tE E rr rr            (3.41) 
With (3.30),  
    * *32 1 1 , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ C Ct t t t t t F t F tE E rr rr            (3.42) 














t t H t H t
H
E
q r E rr
q





                 
 (3.43) 
where (1 )(1 )
(1 )
   
   . 
Using (3.22) and (3.40) to substitute for the output gap and interest rate terms in 
(3.43), the supply equation can be rewritten equivalently in the form  
 
   





ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ                        (1 )
t t t H t t t
t t t t t t
E E
E E
      
      
  
 
   
      
 (3.44) 
                                                          
8 Appendix A.5.  
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For the worldwide flexible price, we have the New Keynesian Phillips Curve of 




















            


                 
 (3.45) 
     As shown in the Appendix A.5., equation (3.45) can be simplified as below; 
   





ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ                (1 ) (1 )
t t t H t t t
t t t t t t H t
E E
E E q
      
           
  
 
   
        
 (3.46) 
     A similar analogy is derived for the New Keynesian Phillips Curve of Country F: 
   
   
* * * *
1 1 2
* * * *4 2
1 1
(1 )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ                (1 ) (1 )
t t t F t t t
t t t t t t F t
E E
E E q
      
           
  
 
   
         
 (3.47) 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE WELFARE FUNCTION AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 
 
1. The Welfare Function and Optimal Subsidy Rate  
Case 1: Non-Cooperative Case (Nash Equilibrium) 
The domestic monetary policy authority seeks to maximize the utility of the 
household, taking as given the other country’s policy and outcomes.  
In open economy, the flexible price economy is not the optimal, because the 
domestic central bank has an incentive to make a surprise change of price level for 
advantage of a household of the domestic country. Therefore, the fiscal authority 
chooses a production subsidy rate that makes the natural level of output correspond to 
the efficient level in a zero inflation steady state, as follows9;    
 1 (1 )n      (5.1) 
Note that subsidy depends only on the openness ( n ), not on the durability ( ).  
We can get the monetary authority’s objective function by taking second-order 
approximation of the utility function of the representative household around the 
domestic flexible price equilibrium. As shown in the Appendix A.7., we obtain the 
following quadratic objective function: 
 






(1 ) ˆ ˆ( )
2
. . , ,
tH
Nash k t t t
tH H
W Ku K E
q
t i p O k y a








                                                          
9 Appendix A.6. 
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where (1 )(1 )
(1 )
   
    
 
Case 2: Cooperative Case 
In this section, we analyze optimal policy under cooperation. We assume that the two 
monetary authorities maximize a weighted sum of the objective functions of the home 
and foreign households. 
Like the Nash equilibrium, we assume that both fiscal authorities choose the subsidy 
rate that maximizes objective function in the steady state. The optimal subsidy rate for 
domestic good is, as follows10;  
 1     (5.3) 
We can get a similar equation of the optimal subsidy rate for foreign good.  
 *1     (5.4) 
This means that two countries’ fiscal authorities (H, F) choose the common subsidy.  
 *1 1       (5.5) 
We can obtain the monetary authority’s objective function by taking second-order 
approximation of the utility function of a weighted average by the relative economic size 
around the globally flexible price equilibrium. As we show in the Appendix A.9., we 
obtain the following quadratic objective function: 
                                                          
10 Appendix A.8. 
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1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ(1 )
2 1
1











t i p O k y a
      











2. Optimal Monetary Policy 
Case 1 : Non-Cooperative Case (Nash Equilibrium) 
An optimal monetary policy in the Nash equilibrium seeks to minimize the 
discounted sum of losses (5.2) subject to the sticky-price equilibrium given by equations 
(3.40) and (3.44). The Lagrangian for this problem is given by 
     
 
   
0
2 22






ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2
(1 )
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )
C C
t t t t t t t H t H t
H
t
t t t H t t tt
t




        
       





                                
 (5.7) 
First order necessary conditions with respect to ,
C
H trr , 1ˆ ˆt t   , and t   are given 
by 
 1, 0t   (5.8) 
    2 21 2, 2, 1ˆ ˆ (1 )t t t t
H
               (5.9) 
 2, 2, 1 2, 2(2 ) (1 ) 0t t H t H t             (5.10) 
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for each 0t  . Following Woodford (1999), the optimal policy under a timeless 
perspective is that the central bank implements conditions (5.9) and (5.10) for all periods. 
Hence, the system of the economy under an optimal policy can be represented by 
equations (3.44), (5.9), and (5.10) given initial conditions, 1ˆ 0   and 2, 2 2, 1 0    .  
Combining (5.9) and (5.10), PPI inflation and the output gap under the optimal 
policy satisfy  
 1 1
1 ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( ) 0
(1 )t t t tH
L           (5.11) 
where L is the lag operator.  
Note that if there is no uncertainty which causes monetary policy to deviate from the 
optimal rule, equation (5.11) can be reduced to the optimal policy rule in a standard 
model given by 
 1 ˆ(1 ) 0
(1 )t tH
L      (5.12) 
which implies that the optimal policy maximizing social welfare is to keep the 
(acquisition) price and the output gap at a constant rate that does not depend on the  
durability of goods. 
We may combine the equation (3.40), with the above solutions to obtain an 





1 , 1 , 2 1
1
1 1 11 1 1
(1 )                              
(1 )
A AH H H
t t H t H t t t t t
H H H H H H
H
t t t
q q qr r rr rr E E




    
   

      
 
 (5.13) 
The optimal rule may be expressed as the sum of three components; the domestic 
natural real interest rate, next period’s expected domestic inflation gap, and a term 
indicating that the central bank adjusts the nominal rate with respect to domestic 
inflation gap.  
We obtain a similar equation of the optimal interest rate rule for the foreign country:     
 
 
* * * * * *
1 , 1 , 2 1
* *3
1
1 1 11 1 1
(1 )                              
(1 )
A AF F F
t t F t H t t t t t
F F F F F F
F
t t t
q q qr r rr rr E E




    
   

      
 
 (5.14) 
Intuitively, the monetary authority needs to change the nominal interest rate less with 
respect to durability, because the monetary policy have more influence on durable goods 
than non-durable goods. The country which produces durable goods (e.g. 1H  ) may 
adjust the nominal interest rate less in response to the domestic inflation rate.      
 
Case 2: Cooperative Case 
An optimal monetary policy in the Cooperation case seeks to minimize the 
discounted sum of losses (5.6) subject to the sticky-price equilibrium given by equations 
(3.41), (3.42) and (3.46), (3.47). The Lagrangian for this problem is given by 
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   
   
   
   
2 22
1
2 2* * * *4
1*
* *0 1
1, , , 1 1
* *32
2, , , 1 1
0
3,
1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2







t H t H t t t t t t t
C C





rr rr E E
rr rr E E
E
      
       
      








   
        
        


   
   
   





* * * *
1 1 2
* * * *4
4, 1 1
(1 )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )
ˆˆ(1 )
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 (5.15) 
First order necessary conditions with respect to ,
C
H trr , ,
C
F trr , 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆt t   , * * 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆt t   , 
and t , *t   are given by 
 1, 0t   (5.16) 
 2, 0t   (5.17) 
    2 21 3, 3, 11 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ (1 )t t t t
H
                (5.18) 
   * * *4 41 4, 4, 1*1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ (1 )1 t t t tFnn                  (5.19) 
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 3, 3, 1 3, 2(2 ) (1 ) 0t t H t H t             (5.20) 
*
4, 4, 1 4, 2(2 ) (1 ) 01 t t F t F t
n
n
             (5.21) 
for each 0t  .  
Combining (5.18), (5.19), (5.20), and (5.21), PPI inflation and the output gap under 
the optimal policy in the cooperative equilibrium can be written as follows  
 1 1
1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( ) 0
(1 )t t t tH
L           (5.22) 
 * * * *1 1
1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( ) 0
(1 )t t t tF
L           (5.23) 
where L is the lag operator.  
We may combine the equations of (3.41) and (3.42), with the above solutions to 
obtain an expression for an interest rate rule that implements the time-consistent policy 
under the cooperative case: 
   0 1
1 , 1 , 2 1
* *
1 1
1 1 11 1 1
(1 ) (1 )                     
(1 ) (1 )
A AH H H
t t H t H t t t t t
H H H H H H
H F
t t t t t t
q q qr r rr rr E E




        
   
 
      
     
(5.24) 
If we consider the case of , 1 , , 1 ,
1 11 1A A A AH H
H t H t H t H t
H H H H
q qrr rr rr rr
q q q q 
    , so the real 
interest rate in the domestic flexible price equilibrium is the same as in the globally 
flexible price equilibrium, optimal policy in the cooperative equilibrium can be written 
as a linear rule of optimal policy in the Nash equilibrium and foreign inflation gap. This 
suggests that the central bank of the country which imports non-durable goods should 
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raise the interest rate by more relative to the Nash case in response to a rise in foreign 
inflation.   
A similar analogy is derived for an interest rate rule of Country F: 
   32
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1 1
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   
 
      
     
(5.25) 
This suggests that the central bank of the country which imports durable goods 
should raise the interest rate by less relative to the Nash case in response to a rise in 


















This dissertation studies a model of an economy which produces and exports durable 
goods. It analyzes the optimal monetary policy for such a country.  
Generally, monetary policy has a bigger economic effect on durable goods relative to 
non-durable goods because durable goods can be stored and households get utility from 
the stock of durable goods. This paper shows that, in Nash equilibrium, the central bank 
of a durable goods producing country can control changes of the price level with smaller 
changes in the monetary policy instrument. In the cooperative equilibrium, the monetary 
authority of the country which imports non-durable goods and exports durable goods 
should raise the interest rate by more, relative to the Nash case, in response to a rise in 
foreign inflation. On the other hand, the monetary authority of the country which imports 
durable goods and exports non-durable goods should raise the interest rate by less than 
the other country.   
      Future work might find interesting implications from examining different values of 
 , and this will probably require numerical analysis. It might also be interesting to show 
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A.1. Proof of *t tK K  (3.3) 



























Given the international tradability of state-contingent bond, the intertemporal 
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The law of one price, * *, , , , ,  /  H t H t t F t t F tP P P P    for all t, and the definition of the 
user cost (2.9) and the cost of living index (2.10), and the uncovered interest parity 
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Using (3.19),  
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A.3. Deriving the country’s natural rates 
From (3.19) 
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A.4. Analytical solution to flexible-price equilibrium 
   Combining  11 (1 )t t H t
H
y         
and *0 1 ,
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Using  , , , 11 (1 )C A AH t H t H t H t
H
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H t t t t trr E E
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Updating (A.1) one period and taking expectations in period t, one obtains 
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 (A.3) 
Using (A.1) and (A.3) to substitute for ,
A
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A.5. Analytical solution to flexible-price equilibrium 
From the optimal price setting rule and the Dixit-Stiglitz price index, we can obtain 
log-linear approximation forms 
 01log ( ) log ( ) (1 ) log ( )t t tP i P i P i     (A.4) 
and    
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Solving this equation for 0log ( )tP i , subtracting log ( )tP i  from both sides
11, we get  
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where 0 0( ) log( ( ) / ( ))t t tp i P i P i  is the log relative price chosen by suppliers that revise 
their prices in period t. 
If above equation is expected to hold in time t+1 as well as time t, it follows that 
 0 01 1( ) (1 ) ( )t t t t t tp i E mc E p i           (A.7) 
Equation (A.4) implies that the inflation rate is proportional (up to a log-linear 
approximation) to the log relative price chosen by suppliers that revise their prices,  
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 (A.9) 
From the log-linearized form of the expression for marginal cost  
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Log-linearize, 
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Then we have the Phillips curve equation from (A.9), 
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A.6. The optimal rate of production subsidy in Nash equilibrium 
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which gives the optimal subsidy rate in this economy, 
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A.7. Second-order approximation of the welfare function in Nash equilibrium 
The second order approximation of the utility of consumption 
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   , and 1 /kk ku u K     , where log( / )t tk K K , we 
obtains  
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The second order approximation of the disutility of labor 
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    represents the elasticity of the marginal disutility of work with 
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where ( )i tE y i  is the mean value of ( )ty i  across all diffentiated goods at time t , and 
var ( )i ty i  is the corresponding variance. 
We use the Taylor series approximation to the CES production function ,  
 311( ) (1 ) var ( )2t i t i ty E y i y i O y      to eliminate ( )i tE y i .  
Then 
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By the definition of the durable good stock,   
 1( ) (1 )( )t t H tY Y Y           (A.22) 
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Combining the formula 2( / 2)t t tX X X x x    with (A.22), one obtains  
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Assume that the initial value of the stock of durables is equal to its steady state value. 
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 
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where 0 1 H     is the smaller root of quadratic equation 
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A.8. The optimal rate of production subsidy in the cooperation equilibrium 
max  *
0
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )tt t t t
t
U u K n v N nv N












t H t t













       
    
    
 
 
   0
0
( ) ( )0 (1 )
( )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )
t j t j t jj t
j t j t j t t
t jj j
k t j H N t
j t j
u K K v Nn
K N N
K
u K n v N

  





        











( ) ( )0
( ) (1 ) ( )
t j t j t jj t
j t j t j t t
t jj j
k t j F tN
j t j
u K K v Nn
K N N
K
u K nv N

  










 In steady states,  
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which gives the optimal subsidy rate for domestic good in this economy, 
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which gives the optimal subsidy rate for foreign good, 
*
* * * * * * *
1




           
This means that two countries’ fiscal authorities (H,F) choose the common subsidy.  
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A.9. Second-order approximation of the welfare function in the cooperation equilibrium 
The second order approximation of the utility of consumption 
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   , and 1 /kk ku u K     , where log( / )t tk K K , we 
obtains  
  31 21( ) (1 ) . .2t k t tu K u K k k t i p O k          (A.28) 
Using *(1 )t t tk       
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